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This paper examines the determinants of human and physical capital at marriage. Using detailed
data from rural Ethiopia, we ￿nd ample evidence of assortative matching at marriage. Assets brought
to marriage are distributed in a highly unequal manner. Sorting operates at a variety of levels ￿
wealth, schooling, and work experience ￿ that cannot be summarized into a single additive index.
For ￿rst unions, assets brought to marriage are positively associated with parents￿ wealth, indicating
that a bequest motive aﬀects assets at marriage. Unlike most brides, grooms appear to accumulate
individual assets over time and over marriages. The marriage market is a major conduit for rural
and gender inequality.
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In agrarian societies marriage is an event of deep economic importance. First, it typically marks the onset
not only of a new household but also of a new production unit, e.g., a family farm. Assets brought to
marriage determine the start-up capital of this new enterprise. The success of the enterprise thus depends
to a large extent on what happens on in the ￿marriage market￿, that is, on the arrangement reached by
the bride and groom and their respective families regarding the devolution of assets to the newly formed
household. Farm formation cannot be dissociated from marriage market considerations. Second, in an
environment where asset accumulation takes time and is particularly diﬃcult for the poor, assets brought
to marriage play a paramount role in shaping the lifetime prosperity of newly formed households: well
married daughters can expect a life of relative comfort while poorly married daughters may spend most
of their life in utter poverty. Assortative matching between spouses ￿ the rich marry the rich, the poor
marry the poor ￿ not only increases inequality, it also reduces social mobility due to intergenerational
transfers of assets at marriage.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of assets brought to marriage in rural
Ethiopia. We do so in two separate steps. First, we investigate the extent to which the socio-economic
characteristics of spouses are correlated. In particular, we examine the correlation between both parental
and personal characteristics of husbands and wives at the time of marriage. We ￿nd that marriage in rural
Ethiopia is better characterized as an assortative matching process rather than as assignment driven by
non-economic factors. This is hardly surprising given that most marriages are arranged by parents and
relatives. We then investigate how rural society endows new couples with the assets they need to set up
a farm and family ￿ typically land and livestock, utensils, grains, and consumer durables such as clothing
and jewelry. We ￿nd that intergenerational transfers take place primarily at the time of marriage. This
is particularly true for men, to whom most productive assets are bequeathed, whether at marriage or
afterwards. We also examine the extent to which parental wealth aﬀects the aggregate amount of wealth
that the couple has at the beginning of marriage, controlling for characteristics of the couple which may
enable them to accumulate assets on their own. We ￿nd that the correlation between parental wealth
and wealth at marriage is high, thereby suggesting relatively low intergenerational mobility.
1Economic analysis of marriage and the family has grown tremendously since ? Treatise on the Fam-
ily. Phenomena such as family formation, intergenerational transfers, and the allocation of resources
within the family, previously the domain of anthropology and sociology, have increasingly been subject
to economic investigation (e.g. Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984, Bergstrom 1997, Weiss 1997, Becker and
Tomes 1986, Behrman 1997, Haddad, Hoddinott and Alderman 1997). Marriage, in particular, is an
institution of great interest, since, in many developing countries, it represents the union not only of two
individuals, but also of two family or kinship groups (Rosenzweig and Stark 1989). Moreover, in many
societies, marriage is the occasion for a substantial transfer of assets from the parent to the child genera-
tion. Lastly, recent work testing the collective versus the unitary model of household decision making has
paid increased attention to conditions prevailing at the time of marriage. In particular, it has been shown
that the distribution of assets between spouses at the time of marriage acts as possible determinant of
bargaining power within marriage (e.g. Thomas, Contreras and Frankenberg 1997, Quisumbing and de
la BriŁre 2000, Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999). While it can be argued that assets at marriage do not
completely determine the distribution of assets upon divorce (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002b), these
measures are, in themselves, worth investigating because they shed light on the institution of marriage
and inheritance in rural societies.
This paper diﬀers from these other works in several respects. First, we distinguish assortative matching
from assets brought to marriage. Second, we separate factors that aﬀect intergenerational transfers from
those that re￿ect the relative scarcity of brides and grooms. Third, unlike other marriage market studies
which focus on dowry and brideprice per se, that is, on transfers at marriage from one family to the other
(e.g. Rao 1993, Foster 1998), we examine the totality of assets brought to marriage, whether these were
acquired from parents or other sources prior to marriage or received at the time of marriage. This more
inclusive measure is more appropriate in rural Ethiopia because gifts from the families to each other and
to the couple account for a small proportion of assets brought to marriage. The main purpose of these
gifts seems to be to seal the marriage and cover the cost of the wedding rather than to endow the new
couple. This lesson should be kept in mind when conducting marriage market studies in other (African)
countries.
2Ethiopia is an ideal site for studying marriage customs, since it is characterized by extensive agro-
ecological and ethnic diversity. Diﬀerent religions, with widely divergent views regarding matrimonial
issues and the status of women, are well represented and tend to dominate diﬀerent parts of the country-
the Orthodox church of Ethiopia in the north, Sunni Muslims in the east and west, recently converted
Protestants in the South, and animist believers in parts of the south. The ethnic and cultural makeup
of the country is also quite varied, with Semitic traditions in the north, Cushitic traditions in the south
and east, and Nilotic traditions in the west. Climatic and ecological variation is equally high, given the
mountainous terrain and the fact that the country stretches from the dry Sahel to the humid equatorial
zone. Finally, local traditions have remained largely untouched given the lack of roads and the relative
isolation of the countryside.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by laying out the conceptual framework
for our analysis. A brief description of the survey and the survey area follows in Section 3. Assortative
matching is examined in Section 4. We continue in Section 5 with a descriptive analysis of assets brought
to marriage, disaggregated by number of unions, and examine the possibility that assortative mating
characterizes Ethiopian marriages using various correlation measures. We also examine the determinants
of the value of assets brought to marriage by the bride and groom and show that intergenerational
transfer considerations aﬀect the aggregate amount transferred to the new family unit. The distribution
of assets at marriage between spouses is analyzed as a function of personal, parental, and marriage market
characteristics. Section 6 concludes.
2. Conceptual Framework
Economic analysis of marriage typically focuses on the gains from marriage and its distribution among
the partners involved. These gains range from joint production and consumption of public goods (e.g.
children), division of labor, and risk-pooling. They aremaximized if the union is likely to last (Weiss 1997).
The decision to form a particular union thus depends not only on the speci￿c merits of a particular match,
but also on the whole range of opportunities available to each partner. Since individuals in any society
have many potential partners, this situation creates competition over the potential gains from marriage.
3There is a large, complex literature on matching (e.g. Gale and Shapley 1962, Roth and Sotomayor
1990, Bergstrom 1997). To motivate the empirical analysis, we present in this Section a rapid overview of
some standard results. Following Becker (1981), we model the ￿marriage market￿ as a process by which
a bride and a groom are paired with each other from a population of suitable grooms and brides. If we
assume ￿transferable utility￿, the matching of marital partners can be modeled as an assignment problem
(Bergstrom 1997). To focus attention on the assignment problem, it is convenient to assume that the
utility that the bride and groom derive from marriage is simply function of the couple￿s joint wealth. We
therefore ignore issues having to do with household public goods and the sharing of consumption among
household members.1
With these assumptions, the welfare W of the newlyweds depends upon what they bring to marriage,
namely physical wealth Am and Af and human capital Hm and Hf,w h e r em stands for groom and f
stands for bride. We have:
W = W(Am + Af,H m,H f;Z) (2.1)
where Z represents a vector of location or time-speci￿c factors that exogenously aﬀect the utility from
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An interesting special case is when human capital is only valued for its income generating potential
and there are no externalities from one spouse￿s human capital to the other￿s. In this case, the utility
from marriage can be written:
W = W(Am + Af +γmHm +γfHf;Z) (2.2)
where γm and γf denote life-time returns from human capital, with γm > 0, and γf > 0.I nt h i ss p e c i a l
case, brides and grooms can be unambiguously ranked: all brides prefer grooms with high Am +γmHm
and all grooms prefer brides with high Am +γmHm.
1It is of course possible to integrate the sharing of household consumption into the analysis, in which case what happens
on the marriage market determines the sharing of consumption after marriage. With transferable utility, however, these
issues can be separated from the assignment problem and thus can be ignored in the simpli￿ed model presented here.
4Equation (2.2) is not true in general, however. For instance, if there are positive externalities in
education and farming, highly educated grooms prefer highly educated brides while grooms with farm
experience prefer brides with farm experience ￿ and vice versa. In this case, grooms rank brides diﬀerently
depending on their own characteristics. With externalities, grooms and brides are ranked according to
multiple attributes. The same conclusion holds if preferences are correlated, so that individuals with
particular traits prefer to choose mates with similar traits.2
We now move to the marriage market proper. There are M potential grooms and F potential brides
i nt h ee c o n o m y ,e a c hw i t ha ne n d o w m e n to fa s s e t sAi and human capital Hi. If equation (2.2) holds,
then without loss of generality, potential grooms and brides can be indexed according to their physical












f >. . .>A F
f +γfHF
f (2.4)
Empirical modeling of marriage markets, with the exception of a few studies that have used census data
to model potential matches (Foster 1998), has thus been stymied by the absence of data on all potential
matches, although proxies for potential opportunities-whether in the marriage or labor markets-have been
used in other studies (Rao 1993).
For simplicity, assume that each of the above inequalities is strict. According to Becker, a pairing of
potential brides and grooms is not a marriage market equilibrium if a groom (bride) wishes to attract
another bride (groom) and this bride (groom) prefers to marry this groom (bride) than her (his) currently
allotted partner. Ignoring polygamy, an assignment is stable if (1) there is no married person who would
rather be single; and (2) there are no two persons who both prefer to form a new union with each other.
With these simple assumptions, we obtain the standard result:
Proposition 1. (Assortative Matching) If equation (2.2) holds, the marriage market equilibrium is
unique. In this equilibrium, the top ranked groom marries the top ranked bride, the second ranked
2Alternatively, individuals may choose partners whose traits compensate for theirs, as when a messy person chooses a
spouse who is neat and organized.
5groom marries the second ranked bride, etc. In the absence of polygyny and polyandry, supernumerary
brides (if M<F )o rg r o o m s( i fM>F ) do not marry. Proof: See (e.g. Becker 1981, Bergstrom 1997).
Assortative matching implies that if we should observe a perfect rank correlation between the combined
physical and human capital of all brides and grooms in a given marriage pool. Testing this simple
prediction is the object of Section 4. Spearman correlation coeﬃcients are computed for each of the main
asset categories. To compute the correlation on joint physical and human capital, we estimate parameters
γm and γf using canonical correlation (e.g. Hotelling 1935, Hotelling 1936, Wicks 1962). To control for
location and time factors, we subtract location-time speci￿c averages from each variable so that ranks
are expressed relative to their village and time of marriage.
The presence of assortative matching also makes it possible to investigate the existence of a single
ranking for brides and grooms.
Proposition 2. (Single ranking) Consider observations on a vector of bride and groom attributes Xm
and Xf. If the welfare from marriage can be written as in equation (2.2), then there exist parameters
βm and βf such that the correlation between βmXm and βfXf exhausts the relationship between Xm
and Xf.( P r o o f :L e t βm = {1,γm} and βf = {1,γf}. This proves existence. Given equation (2.2),
assortative matching implies that once we control for the correlation between βmXm and βfXf ,t h e r e
does not exist another (orthogonal) index constructed using Xm and Xf that is also correlated across
brides and grooms.)
The idea behind the single ranking proposition is that, if individuals are ranked according to multiple
attributes, attributes will be correlated with each other but it is not possible to ￿summarize￿ the correlation
between all bride and groom attributes with the help of a single, optimally chosen index. In contrast,
if the welfare from marriage follows equation (2.2), then such an index exists and it explains all the
correlation between attributes that is present in the data. We test single ranking in Section 4 using
canonical correlation analysis. Single ranking can only be tested with respect to attributes observed
by the researcher. Even if we fail to reject single ranking for observed attributes, there may be other,
unobserved attributes (kinship and family ties, personal traits, geographical proximity) that violate it.
6The marriage market equilibrium does not, however, provide a complete characterization of as-
sets brought to marriage. Since these assets in large part come from the parents of the bride and
groom, bequest considerations come into play as well (e.g. Rosenzweig and Stark 1989, Fafchamps and
Quisumbing 2002a). In agrarian societies, most inheritance indeed takes place at marriage. The bequest
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ωgW(Am + Af +γmHm + γfHf;Z) (2.5)
where the b and g subscripts denote boys and girls, respectively, U(.) is the utility of parents, S is their
wealth, s is the cost of human capital (e.g., school fee), and the ω￿s are welfare weights for sons and
daughters. Variables Am and Af denote the assets given to sons and daughters as they marry; Hm and
Hf denote their level of human capital. Variables ﬂ Am, ﬂ Af, ﬂ Hm, and ﬂ Hf represent the assets and human
capital of the people sons and daughters marry. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002a) examine a version
of model 2.5 and conclude that parents do not adjust their transfer of wealth to marrying children in
response to the assets brought by the spouse. We therefore ignore this possibility here.
Model 2.5 is not the only possible one. For instance, it is also conceivable that the parents of the bride
and groom jointly decide how to endow their oﬀspring. Dropping human capital to simplify notation,
this situation can be represented as:
max
Am,Af
ωpU(Sp −Am;Z)+ωqU(Sq − Af;Z)+( ωb + ωg)W(Am +Af;Z)
where the ω￿s represent welfare weights and subscripts p and q stand for the groom￿s parents and the
bride￿s parents, respectively. In this framework, assets devoted to the newlyweds are decided jointly, one
set of parents compensating for the other. Total assets at marriage Am +Af are a function of the wealth
levels of both sets of parents Sp and Sq. Joint decision can thus be tested as a pooling restriction. Other
possibilities are discussed and investigated in their respective estimation sections.
73. Study site and survey description
Having presented our conceptual framework and outlined our testing strategy, we purport to apply these
ideas to marriage outcomes in rural Ethiopia. The choice of country is dictated by the fact that Ethiopia
is primarily an agrarian economy where marriage market issues are important determinants of welfare.
Ethiopia is indeed a low-income, drought-prone economy with the third largest population on the African
continent. While some work has been done on South Asia (Foster 1998) and West Africa (Jacoby 1995),
very little is known about marriage markets in East Africa. An additional attraction of Ethiopia as a study
site is that it has extensive agro-ecological and ethnic diversity, with over 85 ethnic groups and allegiance
to most major world and animist religions (Webb, von Braun and Yohannes 1992). This diversity should
provide enough variety in marriage market outcomes to identify important determinants.
For our analysis, we rely on the 1997 Ethiopian Rural Household Survey (ERHS) which was undertaken
by the Department of Economics of Addis Ababa University (AAU) in collaboration with the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) of
Oxford University. The 1997 ERHS covered approximately 1500 households in 15 villages across Ethiopia,
capturing much of the diversity mentioned above. While sample households within villages were randomly
selected, the choice of villages themselves was purposive to ensure that the major farming systems were
represented. Thus, while the 15 sites included in the sample may not be statistically representative
of rural Ethiopia as a whole, they are quite representative of its agro-ecological, ethnic, and religious
diversity.
The questionnaire used in the 1997 round includes a set of fairly standard core modules, supplemented
with modules speci￿cally designed to address intrahousehold allocation issues, particularly conditions at
the time of marriage. These modules were designed not only to be consistent with information gathered in
the core modules, but also to complement individual-speci￿c information. These modules were pretested
by the authors in February/March 1997 in four non-survey sites with a level of ethnic and religious
diversity similar to the sample itself. Data collection took place between May and December 1997.
Questionnaires were administered in several separate visits by enumerators residing in the survey villages
for several months. Careful data cleaning and reconciliation across rounds were undertaken in 1998 and
81999 by Bereket Kebede and IFPRI staﬀ.
The intrahousehold modules collect information on: the parental background and marriage histories
of each spouse; the circumstances surrounding the marriage (e.g. type of marriage contract, involvement
in the choice of a spouse); and the premarital human and physical capital of each spouse. A variety
of assets brought to the marriage were recorded, as well as all transfers made at the time of marriage.
These questions, which were asked separately for each union listed by the household head, pertained to
assets brought to marriage by the head and his spouse(s) (or if the household head was female, for herself
and her last husband). Questions were as exhaustive as possible; they covered the value and quantity of
land and livestock, as well as the value of jewelry, linen, clothing, grains, and utensils that each spouse
brought to marriage. In the analysis, values at the time of marriage are converted to current values
using the consumer price index. Given the diﬃculties inherent in a long recall period and in the choice
of an in￿ation correction factor suitable for all 15 villages, these values are likely to be measured with
error. We also collected information on the value of the house brought to marriage by each spouse, if
any. Although questions were asked about cash as well, they yielded very few responses, if any. This
is because accumulation in the form of cash or ￿nancial instruments is essentially absent in the study
area. Questions were asked about transfers from the bride￿s and groom￿s families at the time of marriage,
whether to the couple, or to a speci￿c individual. Parental background information was collected for each
spouse and each union; these included landholdings of the parents at the time the household head was
married, as well as educational attainment of each parent of each spouse. Human capital characteristics
of each spouse included age, education, and experience in three categories of work prior to marriage:
farm work, wage work, and self-employment.
One asset, land, deserves a few words of caution. For some twenty years prior to the survey, rural land
was owned by the Ethiopian state and distributed to individual farmers by the Peasants￿ Association (PA),
a local authority operating at the village level. Land is then periodically reallocated between farmers
to accommodate the needs of young couples. Between these reallocations, farmers hold full user rights
on the land. In practice, reallocations have occurred rather infrequently. Diﬀerent regions also seem
to have interpreted the law diﬀerently, some opting for a collectivist approach while others essentially
9followed the old system of inheritance (e.g. The World Bank 1998, Gopal and Salim 1999). Young couples
typically obtain land through their parents, either directly (gift or land loan) or indirectly by having their
parents lobby the PA. It is also worth noting that, although the sale of agricultural land has been illegal
in Ethiopia for over twenty years, virtually all surveyed households were able to value the land they had
brought to marriage. This leads us to expect that, in rural Ethiopia, parents continue to determine the
land base of newly formed couples.
Table 1 breaks down the sample by household category. We see that twenty percent of surveyed
households are headed by unmarried individuals, most often divorced or widowed women. Monogamous
couples living together represent some 62% of the sample. Polygamous households ￿ or parts thereof ￿
account for 7.6% of the sample, while separated couples account for the remaining 9%. Starting from
these household level data, we construct a marriage data set that contains information recorded for each
union separately. The rest of the analysis presented here is based on this union-level data set.
Survey results show that grooms bring nearly ten times more assets than brides to the newly formed
family unit (Table 2), an average of 4,270 Birr (in 1997 prices), compared to 430 birr for brides. For
grooms, land is the asset with the highest average value. The next most valuable asset is livestock,
followed by grain stocks and other minor assets. In contrast, brides bring very little land to the marriage.
They bring some livestock but less than grooms. Two-thirds of the brides report bringing no asset to
marriage. Gifts at the time of marriage are distributed more evenly between the groom and the bride but
they are very small relative to assets brought to marriage, except for the bride where they are roughly
equivalent. The survey area can thus be described as a system where grooms bring most of the start-up
capital of the newly formed household.
Regarding human capital, newly weds in rural Ethiopia bring very little in terms of education: one
male out of four and one woman out of 10 has been to school (Table 2). If we include other forms of
education such as literacy campaigns and religious education, only one third of surveyed husbands have
a minimum level of literacy. Work experience prior to marriage is more extensive, especially for men
who typically have 12 years of farming experience at the time of marriage, vs. 4 years for brides. This
is a re￿ection of both the younger age of brides and the fact that women participate minimally in ￿eld
10work. Age at marriage also diﬀers markedly, with an average age gap of 10 years. Work experience other
than farming is extremely limited, especially for women ￿ a ￿nding consistent with the negligible role of
non-farm employment in the Ethiopian countryside.
There is a lot of inequality with respect to assets brought to marriage (Table 3). The Gini coeﬃcient
for all combined assets is 0.624. Married couples thus do not all start equal. Some have much more
assets with which to create a new farming enterprise. Given the diﬃculty of asset accumulation in a
poverty stricken environment (e.g. Deaton 1990, Fafchamps and Quisumbing 1999), assets at marriage
probably have an durable eﬀect on income and wealth inequality across rural Ethiopian households. Gini
coeﬃcients for individual assets are higher than for total assets combined, the highest being for land. This
is a paradoxical ￿nding, given that the stated objective of the state-run land allocation system is to give
land to the tiller. Because land reallocations do not take place every year, however, many starting couples
have no land of their own, unless they are fortunate enough that their parents can spare land for them
or unless they had already gained access to land prior to marriage. Inequality is also very large in initial
livestock assets, an area in which there has been very little if any government intervention. That inequality
in land and livestock at the creation of new farm units are roughly of the same magnitude suggests that
redistribution objectives have not been met, in spite of 17 years of Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. It is of
course conceivable that inequality in access to land diminishes over time as periodic land reallocations
shift land toward younger generations, but we do not have the time to pursue the issue further in this
paper. We also observe extreme inequality in assets brought to marriage by brides: most brides bring
nothing while a few bring a lot. In such a polarized society, the presence of a few rich brides is bound to
attract competition.
Table 4 breaks down married couples by number of marriages of each spouse. While the majority of
surveyed husbands (57%) and a higher proportion of wives (67%) have been married only once, multiple
marriages are common. Twenty-three percent of husbands have been married twice, and 11% have been
married thrice. Although we observe men who have been married more than three times, they account
for only nine percent of the sample. Multiple unions are also common among wives, with 23% having
been married twice, and 7% thrice. Only three percent of wives have been married more than thrice, and
11these numbers are driven by individuals with a large number of spouses.
Table 4 presents characteristics of each spouse, disaggregated by the number of unions. Grooms seem
to bring more land, livestock, and assets to subsequent marriages. This is associated with being older
and having more work experience. The same upward trend is not observed for brides: while women who
have been married twice bring more assets to marriage than those who have been married only once,
brides who have been married thrice have even fewer assets than those who were married only once.
Neither does work experience increase for brides in higher unions. These preliminary ￿ndings need to
be con￿rmed by multivariate analysis, as they could result from correlation between multiple forces that
aﬀect assets brought to marriage. This is done in Section 5.
4. Assortative Matching
We now examine whether marriage in rural Ethiopia is characterized by assortative matching. To begin,
we compute Spearman correlation coeﬃcients for the major forms of physical and human capital brought
to marriage. We also compute rank correlation for parents￿ characteristics such as land and schooling,
in case the model presented at the end of Section 2 ￿ts the data best. As argued in Section 2, rank
correlation is a better concept to test assortative matching than regular correlation. For the approach
to be appropriate, however, ranks must be computed within a given marriage pool, that is, individuals
must be ranked relative to other individuals with whom they competed for a mate. It would indeed
make little sense to rank someone who married yesterday at one end of the country relative to someone
who married 30 years ago at the other end. All ranks are therefore computed within district and decade
since marriage. This is not a completely satisfactory solution ￿ people born ten years apart need not
compete with each other for the same spouse. Given that we do not have census data available, the size
of geographical unit and time lag is dictated by the need to preserve a suﬃciently large cell size.3 We
also distinguish between ￿rst marriage and subsequent marriages. To the extent that parents play a more
dominant role in the choice of a spouse at ￿rst marriage, we expect them to follow economic motives
3By crossing district dummies with decade since marriage, we obtain cell sizes of roughly 20 brides and 20 grooms.
Ranks are computed within each of these cells. Results are virtually identical if we only control for district, with cell size
of 80.
12more closely than their impulsive oﬀspring. If this interpretation is correct, assortative matching should
be more pronounced at ￿rst marriage.
Results, presented in Table 5, are highly suggestive of assortative matching. It is extremely unlikely (in
fact, virtually impossible given the reported p-values) that the relative ranks of brides and grooms would
be so closely correlated if marriage pairing was purely random. This is a standard result that has been
obtained almost universally. Brides and grooms appear to be sorted along all measured characteristics,
whether physical or human capital. Matching in subsequent unions seems less dictated by assets and more
by human capital. From this evidence, it is diﬃcult to conclude that assortative matching is stronger at
￿rst marriage. Closer inspection of the data reveals that parents are about as likely to be involved in the
choice of a mate at ￿rst marriage as at subsequent marriages. To investigate this issue further, we compute
rank correlation coeﬃcients separately for brides who had a say on the choice of a spouse and those who
did not. Results, reported on Table 5, suggest that brides￿ involvement increases assortative matching,
particularly at ￿rst marriage. If anything, brides￿ behavior is more consistent with cold rationality as
portrayed in our marriage market model. Results also show that human capital becomes more important
in sorting spouses at subsequent marriages and when brides have a say. This suggests that parents
pay more attention to wealth while children worry more about commonality of professional or personal
interests.
Next we investigate whether brides and grooms are ranked according to a single composite attribute,
such as income earning capacity. If a single composite index cannot be found, it suggests that a uniform
ranking of spouses does not exist. Consider observations on wealth and education of the bride and groom,
for instance. If education matters only through its eﬀect on future income, then a single ranking of brides
and grooms must exist that uses the return to education to translate years of schooling into a wealth
equivalent. In contrast, if the utility from marriage depends on multiple attributes in a non-additive
manner, there will exist several correlated indices of wealth and education that are orthogonal to each
other. Each index captures one dimension or ￿composite attribute￿ along which assortative matching
takes place.
To test these ideas, we estimate canonical correlations between individual attributes of bride and
13grooms. Given two sets of variables Xm and Xf, canonical correlations construct several indices zm =
βmXm and zf = βfXf (as many as the dimension of vectors Xm and Xf) such that the correlation
between each zm and zf is maximized subject to the pair of indices being orthogonal to each other. In
practice, canonical correlations are computed by taking the eigenvalues of a transformation of the cross-
correlation matrix (Wicks 1962). If the two sets of variables are related to each other only through a
single index/linear transformation, as is the case when utility from marriage follows equation 2.2, then one
of the canonical correlations will capture most if not all the correlation between the two vectors. Other
(orthogonal) indices will carry no additional information and correlation will be small and non-signi￿cant.
If, in contrast, there exist multiple indices, more than one canonical correlation will be signi￿cant.
Results are summarized in Table 6. We limit our presentation to the most instructive results. One
robust result is that schooling and wealth are marriage market attributes that are virtually orthogonal
to each other. The ￿rst of the two canonical indices constructed using wealth and schooling de facto
depends only on education; the second depends only on wealth. This suggests that single ranking is not
satis￿ed in our sample: better educated grooms rank educated brides relatively better than uneducated
grooms. Virtually identical results are obtained if land or livestock wealth are used instead of total wealth
at marriage. Table 6 also reports similar results for various forms of wealth or work experience: they
seldom can be regarded as generating a single ranking of potential brides and grooms. Taken together,
these results strongly reject single ranking: brides and grooms are ranked according to multiple attributes
over which preferences diﬀer in a systematical fashion, probably because of externalities in production
and of search for a commonality of professional interests.
The results presented in Table 6 may be biased because they are based on simple correlation analysis,
not on rank correlation. The need for rank correlation is best illustrated with a simple example. Suppose
there is a single index but one male has a very high index relative others. In this case, a simple correlation
coeﬃcient would not ￿exhaust the relationship￿ because of the non-linearity. A two-factor model would
increase the ￿t, the second factor essentially distinguishing the high index male from the others. To
control for this possibility, we redo the analysis using ranks instead of values. Canonical correlations
on the ranks of brides and grooms in various dimensions are reported in Table 7. We have no a priori
14expectation regarding these correlations since rank diﬀerences do not tell anything about the magnitude
of the diﬀerences in levels. At most we expect a slight correlation. Results nevertheless indicate that a
single index exists that predict a person￿s marriage match extremely well: the coeﬃcient of correlation
between the bride￿s and groom￿s index is 0.87. This index is a weighted sum of the ranks of the bride
and groom along the 5 characteristics reported in Table 7. A correlation of 0.84 is obtained using an
unweighted sum of ranks instead. These puzzling results suggest that participants in the marriage market
do not rank potential mates according to an ￿objective￿, welfare-based criterion but rather seek someone
w h os c o r e sw e l lo nan u m b e ro fd i m e n s i o n s .M o r er e s e a r c hi sn e e d e do nt h i st o p i c . 4
5. Assets Brought to Marriage
We now test the predictions of the bequest-at-marriage model outlined in Section 2. We begin with a
set of reduced form regressions in which the dependent variable is the total value of all assets brought to
marriage. As before, all values are expressed in 1997 Ethiopian Birr. Assets include land, livestock, grain,
clothes, linens, jewelry, household utensils, and cash. We also run regressions on land, livestock, and other
assets separately. The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms.5 Because of censoring, tobit is the
chosen estimator. The analysis is conducted for all marriages combined as well as for ￿rst unions and
subsequent unions separately. Since more male than female respondents were previously married, the
number of observations for subsequent unions is larger for men than women. This is but a re￿ection of
the large age gap between men and women at marriage, combined with the fact that, in rural Ethiopia,
previously married women are much less likely to remarry than men.
Assets brought to marriage by the bride and the groom are regressed on parental wealth W (measured
by parental land and a dummy that equals one if father went to school6) and total number of siblings.
We include the ratio of sisters among siblings to control for the possibility of gender diﬀerentials in
inheritance. We expect parental wealth to raise assets brought to marriage, and number of siblings
to reduce it. We also control for the age at marriage and the number of previous unions. We expect
4Foster (1998) proposes an alternative approach with multiple factors, but the method is complex and was not attempted
here.
5To avoid losing observations, zero observations are replaced by 1 Ethiopian Birr, roughly the equivalent of 25 US cents.
6This is the best we can do, given the very low levels of schooling parents of respondents have.
15older individuals to bring more assets to marriage since they and their parents have had more time to
accumulate. Since individual accumulation begins at marriage, the existence of previous unions should
also raise assets brought to marriage, especially for women.7 Returns and cost of education, as well
as other location-speci￿c factors, are controlled for through village dummies. Ethnicity and religion
are added as regressors to control for cultural diﬀerences in attitudes toward bequest. To control for
the possibility of a time trend in marriage practices, the number of years since marriage is included as
regressor as well.
Results are summarized in Tables 8 and 9 for grooms and brides respectively. In both cases, we see that
parental wealth ￿ measured by father￿s land ￿ has a strong positive eﬀect on assets brought to marriage.
The eﬀect is particularly pronounced for women: a 10% increase in the land of the bride￿s father results
in a 10% increase in the assets she brings to marriage. The eﬀect is only signi￿cant at ￿rst marriage.
These results are consistent with the bequest-at-marriage motive: wealthier parents pass on part of their
wealth to their children at ￿rst marriage. No further bequest is made at subsequent marriages. Age at
marriage is also a strong determinant of assets brought: even after controlling for number of previous
unions, older brides and grooms tend to bring signi￿cantly more assets. The eﬀect is signi￿cant for brides
and grooms at ￿rst union, but only signi￿cant for grooms at subsequent unions: women do not appear to
accumulate assets as they age or marry several times. One possible interpretation of the age eﬀect is thus
that parents compensate children who marry late ￿ and work longer on their parents￿ farm ￿ by endowing
them better at marriage. This interpretation is consistent with qualitative information collected during
the survey.8 There are very strong village-level eﬀects, a sign of sharp wealth diﬀerences across regions.
With the exception that Oromo brides bring more assets at ￿rst marriage, we ￿nd little evidence of ethnic
or religion eﬀects. Regional diﬀerences in assets brought to marriage thus seem more due to geographical
than cultural factors. We ￿nd no evidence of sibling competition or time trends.
To further investigate the bequest interpretation, we estimate similar regressions using as dependent
7Young, never married women may make more desirable brides. This would raise their marriage prospects (i.e., the
assets of their expected match) but it should not raise the assets they bring to marriage. If anything, it should lower them.
Indeed, if parents wish to achieve comparable levels of lifetime welfare for their children, they would compensate children
with less attractive marriage prospects by giving them more assets ￿ and thus by giving fewer assets to otherwise more
desirable brides.
8It is also possible that individuals accumulate assets as they age, if they are permitted to keep assets after a marriage
dissolves. If grooms are favored in asset disposition upon divorce, they can accumulate assets over subsequent marriages
while brides would be less likely to do so.
16variable assets inherited after marriage. For men, three quarters of inherited wealth is land while the
rest is livestock; the opposite is true for women. Results (not shown here for the sake of brevity) indicate
that the groom￿s number of brothers has a strong negative eﬀect on inheritance. This eﬀect is very close
to ￿ and not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from minus one. This is a clear indication of sibling competition in
inheritance: since both inheritance and number of siblings are expressed in logs, we would indeed expect a
coeﬃcient of minus one if inheritance is equally divided among siblings. With sisters, competition is much
less pronounced, an expected result since women inherit much less in general. Results also show that assets
brought to marriage by the groom have no in￿uence on subsequent inheritance.9 For brides, however,
parental land and assets brought to marriage are strong positive predictors of subsequent inheritance.10
This suggests that what brides receive at marriage is not really an advance on their inheritance, but
rather a gift that foreshadows an (albeit unlikely) inheritance yet to come. In contrast, grooms￿ assets at
marriage might in part be regarded as advanced inheritance.11
Results for individual assets brought to marriage are reported in Tables 10 to 12. We focus on
the groom￿s assets only due to the small number of non-zero observations for individual assets brought
by brides. By and large, the Tables con￿rm earlier ￿ndings. Parental land is shown to be a strong
determinant of land at marriage. This ￿nding suggest that the land redistribution role of the PA is
insuﬃcient to ensure equal access to land for all young couples. Time trend eﬀects are shown to aﬀect
the composition of assets at marriage. Over time, the (de￿ated) value of land brought by grooms has
increased dramatically.12 Since a similar increase in not shown when area is used as dependent variable
instead of land value, this suggests that the value of land has increased faster than in￿ation ￿ probably
because of increased population pressure. In contrast, the value of livestock has decreased over time,
most probably because of a drop in the number of animals. Taken together, these results suggest that
young couples in rural Ethiopia today start their life with fewer productive assets than their parents.
9In some speci￿cations, the eﬀect is negative, as one would expect if assets brought to marriage are a form of bequest.
The eﬀect is not signi￿cant, however, probably because we do not adequately control for parents￿ wealth at the time of
marriage.
10Brides do not, in general, inherit anything ￿ only 11% of them do. It is possible that they only inherit in the absence
of an eligible male heir. This issue deserves more investigation.
11Grooms are more likely to receive an advance on their inheritance because the kinds of assets they receive are typically
those needed as start-up capital for the new farm and family unit ￿ e.g., land and livestock. In contrast, brides inherit
assets for which the timing of receipt is not as crucial .
12Brides bring very little land.
17Next we investigate whether human capital characteristics of the bride and groom aﬀect the assets
they bring to marriage. If schooling or work experience are treated as a substitute for wealth, we would
expect parents to give less educated children more wealth (Quisumbing 1994). A negative sign on human
capital would thus signal parents￿ desire to compensate their less educated children. On the other hand,
a bride or groom with more work experience may also have accumulated more assets or may have built
more implicit claims on their parents￿ resources. We would thus observe a positive sign on human capital
if assets brought to marriage partly re￿ect the individual work eﬀort of the bride and groom.
We regress assets brought to marriage on the same regressors plus four measures of human capital:
a schooling index and years of work experience at marriage in three activities: farming, wage work, and
non-farm self-employment. Results are shown on Tables 13 and 14 for groom and bride, respectively.
Results suggest that, if anything, the groom￿s farming experience has a positive eﬀect on assets brought
to marriage, but the eﬀect is not signi￿cant.13 Years of wage work tend to reduce assets brought to
marriage, a ￿nding probably due to the correlation between menial wage work and a history of poverty
and landlessness. Better educated grooms get signi￿cantly more land at marriage, a ￿nding inconsistent
with a desire by parents and PA to compensate less educated new couples by giving them more land.
Results for brides are in general inconclusive: their human capital seems to have little eﬀect on the assets
they bring to marriage. The only exception is for assets other than land and livestock: brides with
farming experience bring fewer of them. This eﬀect is consistent with the parental substitution eﬀect
discussed above, but it should be discounted given that no such eﬀect is observed with other types of
assets.
Before concluding, we test whether the parents of the bride and groom indeed act as one when they
decide to endow their oﬀspring. So far we have assumed that they participate in the competition for
brides and grooms and we have shown that they use their own assets to leverage better marriage prospects
for their children. In Section 2, however, we pointed out that alternative models of parental behavior
are conceivable. In one of these, conditional on a match having taken place, parents pool their resources
so that if the parents of the groom cannot aﬀord to give much, the parents of the bride pitch in more.
13Marginally signi￿cant for land.
18Pooling test results are presented in Table 15 in which we regress total assets at marriage on the total land
of the bride and groom￿s parents, and test whether the coeﬃcients are the same. Results are diﬀerent for
￿rst and subsequent marriages. At ￿rst marriage, the land of the groom￿s parents has a strong in￿uence
on total assets brought to marriage by the bride and the groom together; the land of the bride￿s parents
does not. Pooling is rejected. Parental education has no eﬀect on assets at marriage, probably because
so few parents in the sample received any education. In contrast, parental land has no eﬀect on assets
brought to subsequent marriages. In this case pooling cannot be rejected but this simply re￿ects that
none of the parental characteristics are signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. These results further con￿rm
that the marriage market model ￿ts the data better than more benign cooperative models of household
formation.
6. Conclusion
We have examined the determinants of assets brought to marriage in rural Ethiopia. These determinants
indeed shape the distribution of assets and incomes in a society characterized by widespread poverty
￿ hence where it is diﬃcult to accumulate. Assets at marriage also aﬀect farm size distribution since
newlyweds typically initiate their own, separate farming operations. Assets brought at marriage thus
constitute the dominant form of start-up capital for new farms.
Results indicate that assets brought to marriage are distributed in a highly unequal manner. This
is true for all assets. We ￿nd no diﬀerence in the magnitude of inequality at marriage between land
and livestock, in spite of two decades of a stated ￿land to the tiller￿ government policy and (virtually)
no intervention to redistribute livestock. These ￿ndings suggest that the land reallocation mechanism
as practiced by Peasant Associations tends to penalize young couples. Given the extent of inequality at
marriage, land inequality is likely to endure in rural Ethiopia for the foreseeable future.
We show that, to a large extent, the formation of new couples in rural Ethiopia is characterized by
assortative matching. Sorting operates at a variety of levels ￿ wealth, schooling, and work experience ￿
that cannot be summarized into a single additive index. We interpret this result as meaning that grooms
do not all rank prospective brides in the same manner, e.g., more educated grooms rank educated brides
19higher than uneducated grooms. Combined with high inequality in assets brought to marriage, our results
suggest that the pairing of prospective brides and grooms favors the reproduction of rural inequality over
time.
Using a simple non-cooperative model of bequest at marriage, we examine what factors determine
assets brought to marriage. We ￿nd that parental background helps predict what individuals bring to
their ￿rst marriage. Moreover groom￿s inheritance appears uncorrelated with previous assets brought
to marriage. These ￿ndings provide some (albeit limited) support to the idea that parents bequeath
productive assets to their sons at the time of ￿rst marriage. In contrast, the little that daughters receive
at marriage is a strong predictor of subsequent inheritance. Amounts involved remain small, however, and
the great majority of women receive nothing at marriage or later from their parents. Sibling competition
and education of parents are not important determinants of inequality at marriage, but competition
among brothers reduces inheritance one for one.
Individual accumulation prior to marriage also plays a role. For the groom, a prior marriage is a strong
determinant of land brought to marriage, an indication that peasant associations give land to already
existing households and that husbands keep the land upon dissolution of the union. This is consistent with
the description of divorce and inheritance practices as described by rural Ethiopian households themselves
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2002b). Grooms also accumulate livestock over time. In contrast, women
hardly ever own land and do not appear to accumulate livestock or retain it upon marriage dissolution.
The only exception is assets other than land and livestock, which a small minority of women accumulate
over time and across marriages.
Human capital at marriage, either in the form of schooling or work experience, does not seem to be
considered as substitutes for wealth. This is probably due to the low level of schooling recorded in the data
and to the fact that, in traditional agriculture such as that practiced in Ethiopia, schooling is of little value
to farming. Returns to schooling are in general higher in non-farm activity (e.g. Yang 1997, Fafchamps
and Quisumbing 1999) but the surveyed rural areas report very little of it. We reject the hypothesis that
parents of the bride and groom act as one after marriage partners have been identi￿ed.
Taken together, these results suggest that the marriage market model provides a reasonable approxi-
20mation of what goes on in rural Ethiopia, provided it is amended to include bequest motives and multiple
ranking. The rich marry the rich, the poor marry the poor, and social strati￿cation is largely passed on
from one generation to the next. Parents act strategically in choosing a suitable spouse for their children.
Although we ￿nd a small number of richly endowed brides, the majority of women in the sample inherit
nothing at marriage or afterwards from their parents. Unlike men, most do not appear to accumulate
wealth over time and marriages. The marriage market appears to be a major conduit for household and
gender inequality in the Ethiopian countryside. To complete this picture, one would need to know how
much social mobility there is after marriage, e.g., how fast households can accumulate assets and obtain
l a n df r o mt h eP A ,a n dh o we a s i l yt h e yc a ns w i t c ht oh i g hi n c o m ep r o f e s s i o n s .G i v e nt h ep r e d o m i n a n t l y
agrarian nature of the surveyed area and the relative lack of remunerative non-farm activities, we suspect
that social mobility is low. This issue deserves more investigation.
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23Table 1. Composition of the sample by category of household
Percent Number Unmarried individuals
5.1% 72 Single man living alone
16.8% 239 Single woman living alone
21.9% Monogamous couples
61.8% 877 Monogamous couple living together
4.9% 69 Monogamous couple, husband away
3.9% 55 Monogamous couple, wife away
70.5% Polygamous households
5.7% 81 Polygamous household living together
1.5% 21 Male headed part of a polygamous couple residing separately
0.4% 6 Female headed part of a polygamous couple residing separately
7.6%
1420 TotalTable 2.  Assets at marriage, Inheritance, Human Capital, and Parental Characteristics
Bride's assets Groom's assets
Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Assets brought to marriage:
0 833 90 377 5955 2056 Land value
0 1790 300 287 2833 1337 Livestock value
0 232 40 448 1587 877 Jewelry, clothes, linens, utensils and grain
0 2035 430 1981 7433 4270 Total value of assets prior to marriage
0 885 401 0 761 234 Gifts at marriage (1)
Inheritance after marriage:
0 657 75 0 8452 2060 Inherited land
0 346 80 0 1038 260 Inherited livestock
342 2395 987 3576 11848 6820 Total assets at marriage plus inheritance
Human capital
18.3 8.1 19.3 27.3 11.7 29.9 Age at marriage
0% 13% 0% 33% Literate (2)
0% 10% 0% 25% At least some primary education
0% 2% 0% 7% At least some secondary education
1.0 5.8 3.7 10.0 10.3 11.7 Years of farming experience
0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 2.5 0.7 Years of wage work experience
0.0 1.5 0.3 0.0 2.9 0.8 Years of self-employment experience
Parental characteristics
0.4 9.9 1.9 0.6 74.0 6.5 Father's land (in hectares)
0% 7% 0% 7% Father went to school (yes=1)
1179 No. of observations
All unions included. All values expressed in 1997 Ethiopian Birr.
(1) Gifts made to bride and groom only. A few gifts given to both jointly are divided equally for the purpose of this table.
(2) Either some formal education or some literacy or religious education.Table 3. Gini distribution of assets at marriage
Both Bride Groom (All assets measured in 1997 Ethiopian Birr.)
0.786 0.977 0.794 Land
0.761 0.910 0.778 Livestock
0.639 0.929 0.659 Other assets
0.624 0.871 0.642 TotalTable 4.  Characteristics at marriage by number of marriages
Fourth and above Third marriage Second marriage First marriage A. Groom
106 126 273 674 Number of observations
9% 11% 23% 57% Percentage of all married males
Assets brought to marriage:
806 3084 689 2080 559 1945 153 1935 Land value
453 1596 869 1860 418 1511 0 1128 Livestock value
469 738 534 1109 479 881 408 853 Jewelry, clothes, linens, utensils and grain
3120 5418 3098 5056 2137 4337 1612 3916 Total value of assets prior to marriage
0 108 0 228 0 172 0 281 Gifts at marriage (1)
Inheritance after marriage:
0 1786 0 1403 0 1818 0 2324 Inherited land
0 174 0 304 0 267 0 263 Inherited livestock
4490 7486 4313 6949 3339 6593 3342 6784 Total assets at marriage plus inheritance
Human capital
42.3 43.8 34.1 35.9 30.3 33.2 24.3 25.5 Age at marriage
0% 22% 0% 12% 0% 30% 0% 40% Literate (2)
0% 12% 0% 9% 0% 20% 0% 32% At least some primary education
0% 1% 0% 2% 0% 6% 0% 9% At least some secondary education
23.0 21.8 14.0 16.1 10.0 11.6 8.0 9.4 Years of farming experience
0.0 0.8 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.6 Years of wage work experience
0.0 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.8 Years of self-employment experience
Parental characteristics
0.8 6.0 0.6 6.4 0.7 3.8 0.6 7.7 Father's land (in hectares)
0% 6% 0% 11% 0% 7% 0% 7% Father went to school (yes=1)
Fourth and above Third marriage Second marriage First marriage B. Bride
39 79 267 795 Number of observations
3% 7% 23% 67% Percentage of all married females
Assets brought to marriage:
0 18 0 83 0 270 0 34 Land value
0 215 0 304 0 447 0 254 Livestock value
0 38 0 58 0 70 0 28 Jewelry, clothes, linens, utensils and grain
0 271 0 444 0 786 0 317 Total value of assets prior to marriage
0 165 0 169 0 246 74 488 Gifts at marriage (1)
Inheritance after marriage:
0 105 0 184 0 93 0 57 Inherited land
0 23 0 143 0 93 0 72 Inherited livestock
102 563 310 940 300 1219 359 934 Total assets at marriage plus inheritance
Human capital
27.9 28.0 20.5 22.9 22.4 22.8 17.3 17.4 Age at marriage
0% 6% 0% 16% 0% 10% 0% 14% Literate (2)
0% 3% 0% 13% 0% 5% 0% 11% At least some primary education
0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 1% 0% 2% At least some secondary education
4.0 9.8 2.0 4.6 2.0 4.5 0.0 3.0 Years of farming experience
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 Years of wage work experience
0.0 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.3 Years of self-employment experience
Parental characteristics
0.2 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.5 2.9 0.4 1.7 Father's land (in hectares)
0% 8% 0% 4% 0% 8% 0% 7% Father went to school (yes=1)
Only currently married people included. All values expressed in 1997 Ethiopian Birr.
(1) Gifts made to bride and groom only. A few gifts given to both jointly are divided equally for the purpose of this table.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 6. Canonical Correlations on Assets and Human Capital at Marriage
Schooling Wealth A. Wealth and Schooling
t-value coef. t-value coef. First canonical correlation:
10.958 0.531 0.589 0.000 groom index
10.962 0.817 1.077 0.000 bride index
0.338 coefficient of correlation
Second canonical correlation:
-0.515 -0.043 6.429 0.000 groom index
-0.483 -0.062 6.407 0.001 bride index
0.206 coefficient of correlation
942 Number of observations
Other assets Value of livestock Value of land B. Asset types
t-value coef. t-value coef. t-value coef. First canonical correlation:
9.900 0.001 -3.136 -0.000 3.041 0.000 groom index
-2.291 -0.001 2.151 0.000 10.326 0.001 bride index
0.310 coefficient of correlation
Second canonical correlation:
0.514 0.000 6.525 0.000 -0.114 -0.000 groom index
4.948 0.004 4.264 0.001 -0.125 -0.000 bride index
0.201 coefficient of correlation
1108 Number of observations
Self-employment Wage work Farming C. Work experience
t-value coef. t-value coef. t-value coef. First canonical correlation:
-0.955 -0.021 1.740 0.044 15.825 0.109 groom index
1.705 0.077 1.497 0.138 15.624 0.192 bride index
0.450 coefficient of correlation
Second canonical correlation:
7.200 0.327 2.712 0.139 -0.024 -0.000 groom index
6.127 0.561 4.553 0.854 -1.385 -0.035 bride index
0.241 coefficient of correlation
999 Number of observations




































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 8. Assets Brought to Marriage by the Groom
(dependent variable is the log of the value of all assets brought to marriage, expressed in current value)
subsequent   
marriages first marriage all marriages
503 647 1150 Number of observations
0.033 0.042 0.029 Pseudo R-squared
t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. Wealth of parents
0.645 0.086 3.512 0.462 2.709 0.257 Land of father (log +1)
0.410 0.161 -0.508 -0.224 0.144 0.043 Whether father went to school
Competition among siblings
0.185 0.037 -0.567 -0.115 0.272 0.039 Number of siblings + self (log)
0.525 0.291 0.170 0.094 0.501 0.196 Share of sisters among siblings
Personal history
1.977 0.018 1.901 0.029 3.013 0.024 Age at marriage
0.406 0.034 not applicable 1.606 0.117 Number of previous marriages
Time and space (Harresaw ommitted)
1.413 0.014 0.337 0.003 1.511 0.010 Number of years since marriage
-2.011 -2.128 -1.150 -0.821 -1.693 -0.997 Geblen village dummy
-1.125 -1.310 2.001 2.066 1.595 1.197 DInki village dummy
-0.907 -1.118 1.348 1.761 1.388 1.155 Yetmen village dummy
-1.954 -2.325 0.745 0.789 0.149 0.115 Shumshaha village dummy
-1.272 -1.482 2.707 2.492 1.902 1.372 Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-1.583 -1.780 -1.011 -0.978 -0.506 -0.368 Adele Keke village dummy
-1.307 -1.526 1.074 1.010 1.048 0.765 Korodegaga village dummy
-2.895 -3.139 1.422 1.128 0.134 0.086 Tirufe Kechema village dummy
-0.961 -1.347 0.176 0.201 0.014 0.012 Imdibir village dummy
-0.394 -0.698 0.331 0.363 0.082 0.073 Aze Deboa village dummy
-2.060 -2.863 -1.357 -1.479 -1.897 -1.635 Adado village dummy
-1.575 -2.112 0.866 0.928 0.155 0.130 Gara Godo village dummy
-0.939 -1.297 0.437 0.495 0.385 0.339 Doma village dummy
-1.057 -1.297 2.070 2.015 1.730 1.313 Debre Birhan village dummy
Ethnicity dummies (Tigray excluded)
2.661 2.649 -0.765 -0.627 0.049 0.031 Amhara
3.353 3.349 -0.713 -0.533 0.698 0.415 Oromo
2.366 2.817 -0.218 -0.207 0.676 0.502 South-Central
1.935 2.179 -1.756 -1.492 -0.839 -0.568 Other/mixed
Religion dummies (Orthodox excluded)
0.380 0.235 0.035 0.020 0.273 0.113 Muslim
0.247 0.111 1.451 0.606 1.205 0.374 Other Christian
-0.463 -0.348 -0.209 -0.142 -0.405 -0.207 Other
6.460 5.131 6.934 5.337 9.324 5.030 Intercept
2.281 2.664 2.568 Selection-term
33 69 102 Number of censored observations
470 578 1048 Number of uncensored observations
p-value F-stat Joint tests:
0.4030 1.01 Ethnicity
0.4469 0.89 ReligionTable 9. Assets Brought to Marriage by the Bride
(dependent variable is the log of the value of all assets brought to marriage, expressed in current value)
subsequent   
marriages first marriage all marriages
333 746 1079 Number of observations
0.086 0.168 0.121 Pseudo R-squared
t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. Wealth of parents
0.299 0.164 2.430 1.121 2.262 0.825 Land of father (log +1)
1.165 1.828 0.090 0.115 0.890 0.882 Whether father went to school
Competition among siblings
0.711 0.664 -0.487 -0.348 0.287 0.163 Number of siblings + self (log)
0.552 0.425 -1.576 -1.236 -0.445 -0.240 Share of sisters among siblings
Personal history
1.122 0.060 2.135 0.123 2.220 0.087 Age at marriage
-1.303 -0.559 not applicable 0.095 0.028 Number of previous marriages
Time and space (Harresaw ommitted)
-0.045 -0.002 -1.482 -0.046 -1.525 -0.038 Number of years since marriage
0.213 0.841 -3.821 -9.921 -3.577 -7.428 Geblen village dummy
-1.439 -6.768 -2.035 -7.042 -2.603 -7.157 DInki village dummy
-1.673 -8.301 -2.411 -11.180 -3.168 -9.424 Yetmen village dummy
-0.036 -0.168 -0.451 -1.552 -0.244 -0.662 Shumshaha village dummy
-1.379 -6.648 -3.503 -11.947 -3.745 -10.381 Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-2.009 -8.909 -3.657 -12.930 -3.940 -10.728 Adele Keke village dummy
-0.202 -0.841 -2.862 -9.225 -2.410 -6.054 Korodegaga village dummy
-1.227 -5.049 -3.088 -8.969 -3.243 -7.564 Tirufe Kechema village dummy
-1.624 -8.444 -0.761 -3.001 -1.965 -6.009 Imdibir village dummy
-0.950 -5.471 -1.719 -6.798 -2.723 -8.543 Aze Deboa village dummy
-2.186 -11.476 -2.264 -9.041 -3.807 -11.951 Adado village dummy
-0.926 -4.560 -1.528 -5.711 -2.505 -7.228 Gara Godo village dummy
-0.561 -2.866 -2.343 -9.552 -2.517 -7.682 Doma village dummy
-0.159 -0.750 0.016 0.053 0.042 0.111 Debre Birhan village dummy
Ethnicity dummies (Tigray excluded)
0.679 2.825 1.456 4.461 1.401 3.379 Amhara
0.672 2.540 1.882 5.621 1.825 4.238 Oromo
0.717 2.908 -0.511 -1.782 0.260 0.671 South-Central
-0.411 -1.831 0.083 0.273 -0.287 -0.743 Other/mixed
Religion dummies (Orthodox excluded)
0.285 0.594 -0.518 -0.935 -0.557 -0.768 Muslim
-0.617 -1.201 -0.498 -0.731 -0.273 -0.319 Other Christian
-0.721 -2.541 . -30.081 -0.762 -1.980 Other
-0.197 -0.665 0.001 0.002 -0.413 -0.777 Intercept
6.018 6.151 6.435 Selection-term
203 573 776 Number of censored observations
130 173 303 Number of uncensored observations
Joint tests:
0.0272 2.75 Ethnicity
0.8429 0.28 ReligionTable 10. Land Brought to Marriage by the Groom
(dependent variable is the log of the value of land brought to marriage, expressed in current value)
subsequent   
marriages first marriage all marriages
503 647 1150 Number of observations
0.065 0.054 0.052 Pseudo R-squared
t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. Wealth of parents
0.376 0.099 4.433 1.310 3.811 0.759 Land of father (log +1)
-0.657 -0.506 -0.434 -0.440 -0.193 -0.123 Whether father went to school
Competition among siblings
-1.116 -0.439 -1.105 -0.508 -0.974 -0.296 Number of sibblings + self (log)
1.925 2.083 -0.812 -1.032 0.897 0.744 Share of sisters in sibblings
Personal history
3.151 0.056 0.919 0.031 3.666 0.061 Age at marriage
-0.144 -0.023 not applicable 2.274 0.341 Number of previous marriages
Time and space (Harresaw ommitted)
-4.516 -0.085 -3.948 -0.085 -5.695 -0.083 Number of years since marriage
-2.370 -4.956 0.713 1.262 -0.730 -0.958 Geblen village dummy
-1.704 -4.077 1.921 4.772 1.031 1.703 DInki village dummy
-0.934 -2.343 0.675 2.106 1.108 2.001 Yetmen village dummy
-3.205 -7.867 -1.403 -3.826 -2.030 -3.487 Shumshaha village dummy
-0.976 -2.310 2.457 5.263 1.948 3.009 Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-1.375 -3.226 1.520 3.441 1.516 2.366 Adele Keke village dummy
-1.684 -4.081 2.570 5.615 1.762 2.758 Korodegaga village dummy
-2.864 -6.669 2.216 4.181 0.708 0.990 Tirufe Kechema village dummy
-0.148 -0.423 2.120 5.820 2.242 4.371 Imdibir village dummy
0.375 1.311 4.149 10.863 3.931 7.596 Aze Deboa village dummy
-0.873 -2.486 2.240 5.845 1.780 3.356 Adado village dummy
0.283 0.783 3.823 9.784 3.596 6.615 Gara Godo village dummy
-0.530 -1.496 1.830 4.940 1.685 3.232 Doma village dummy
-1.263 -3.163 1.811 4.246 1.124 1.875 Debre Birhan village dummy
Ethnicity dummies (Tigray excluded)
1.366 2.875 -0.254 -0.492 -0.044 -0.060 Amhara
0.977 2.067 -0.303 -0.511 -0.488 -0.618 Oromo
0.212 0.535 -1.118 -2.498 -1.284 -2.097 South-Central
-0.224 -0.529 -1.561 -3.255 -1.764 -2.690 Other/mixed
Religion dummies (Orthodox excluded)
2.608 3.181 0.106 0.137 1.546 1.367 Muslim
2.402 2.094 -0.304 -0.286 0.709 0.460 Other Christian
0.998 1.445 -1.526 -2.410 -0.983 -1.064 Other
2.533 3.821 -0.276 -0.504 0.134 0.155 Intercept
4.235 5.601 5.084 Selection-term
159 301 460 Number of censored observations
344 346 690 Number of uncensored observations
Joint tests:
0.1213 1.83 Ethnicity
0.1852 1.61 ReligionTable 11. Livestock Brought to Marriage by the Groom
(dependent variable is the log of the value of livestock brought to marriage, expressed in current value)
subsequent   
marriages first marriage all marriages
505 647 1152 Number of observations
0.058 0.102 0.076 Pseudo R-squared
t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. Wealth of parents
0.541 0.158 2.330 0.664 1.362 0.277 Land of father (log +1)
-0.405 -0.360 -1.289 -1.331 -0.602 -0.408 Whether father went to school
Competition among siblings
1.127 0.525 -1.046 -0.479 0.294 0.096 Number of siblings + self (log)
0.303 0.380 0.369 0.458 0.956 0.834 Share of sisters among siblings
Personal history
2.284 0.048 2.143 0.072 2.974 0.053 Age at marriage
1.282 0.244 not applicable 2.557 0.406 Number of previous marriages
Time and space (Harresaw ommitted)
2.294 0.050 -0.074 -0.002 1.736 0.026 Number of years since marriage
-1.073 -2.629 -3.388 -8.198 -3.576 -5.690 Geblen village dummy
0.850 2.389 1.719 4.437 2.186 4.026 DInki village dummy
-0.118 -0.347 0.725 2.287 1.090 2.158 Yetmen village dummy
0.502 1.429 2.568 6.557 2.417 4.463 Shumshaha village dummy
-0.195 -0.540 3.592 7.653 2.471 4.141 Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-1.640 -4.517 -1.561 -3.579 -1.794 -3.047 Adele Keke village dummy
-0.396 -1.116 -0.026 -0.057 0.330 0.556 Korodegaga village dummy
-1.137 -3.021 0.733 1.356 -0.123 -0.185 Tirufe Kechema village dummy
-0.241 -0.829 -0.604 -1.625 -0.699 -1.476 Imdibir village dummy
0.960 3.958 0.663 1.686 0.800 1.663 Aze Deboa village dummy
-2.095 -7.343 -2.450 -6.462 -3.303 -6.939 Adado village dummy
-0.191 -0.635 0.909 2.291 0.399 0.798 Gara Godo village dummy
0.358 1.202 -0.050 -0.135 0.293 0.608 Doma village dummy
0.878 2.570 3.517 8.523 3.471 6.367 Debre Birhan village dummy
Ethnicity dummies (Tigray excluded)
0.422 1.033 -0.787 -1.642 -0.360 -0.558 Amhara
0.926 2.267 -0.125 -0.218 0.782 1.098 Oromo
-0.136 -0.407 0.272 0.609 0.210 0.375 South-Central
-1.297 -3.641 -1.564 -3.839 -2.004 -3.606 Other/mixed
Religion dummies (Orthodox excluded)
1.149 1.680 1.326 1.761 1.322 1.279 Muslim
0.100 0.108 0.580 0.568 0.416 0.302 Other Christian
0.859 1.751 0.755 1.347 1.039 1.387 Other
-0.634 -1.149 -1.229 -2.155 -1.850 -2.256 Intercept
4.862 5.277 5.200 Selection-term
196 334 530 Number of censored observations
309 313 622 Number of uncensored observations
Joint tests:
0.0070 3.55 Ethnicity
0.4619 0.86 ReligionTable 12. Other Assets Brought to Marriage by the Groom
(dependent variable is the log of the value of other assets brought to marriage, expressed in current value)
subsequent   
marriages first marriage all marriages
505 647 1152 Number of observations
0.020 0.036 0.019 Pseudo R-squared
t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. Wealth of parents
0.514 0.084 0.033 0.006 -0.096 -0.011 Land of father (log +1)
0.244 0.119 0.696 0.395 0.521 0.199 Whether father went to school
Competition among siblings
0.835 0.210 -1.311 -0.347 -0.249 -0.046 Number of siblings + self (log)
-0.045 -0.031 0.884 0.631 0.743 0.370 Share of sisters among siblings
Personal history
0.813 0.009 -2.881 -0.057 -0.951 -0.010 Age at marriage
0.470 0.049 2.592 0.239 Number of previous marriages
Time and space (Harresaw ommitted)
2.123 0.025 -1.785 -0.021 0.098 0.001 Number of years since marriage
0.178 0.234 0.345 0.315 0.361 0.269 Geblen village dummy
0.067 0.098 1.025 1.361 1.335 1.268 DInki village dummy
1.218 1.873 1.892 3.158 2.802 2.946 Yetmen village dummy
0.202 0.300 0.669 0.910 1.271 1.241 Shumshaha village dummy
0.241 0.351 2.199 2.595 2.294 2.094 Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-0.186 -0.261 -0.919 -1.144 0.054 0.050 Adele Keke village dummy
0.162 0.237 0.731 0.878 1.399 1.290 Korodegaga village dummy
-0.645 -0.876 2.102 2.131 1.795 1.458 Tirufe Kechema village dummy
-1.490 -2.625 0.223 0.328 -0.477 -0.542 Imdibir village dummy
-1.394 -3.102 -0.536 -0.756 -1.268 -1.436 Aze Deboa village dummy
-1.513 -2.641 -1.324 -1.857 -1.633 -1.791 Adado village dummy
-1.866 -3.150 -0.429 -0.592 -1.101 -1.179 Gara Godo village dummy
-1.404 -2.439 0.437 0.635 -0.138 -0.154 Doma village dummy
0.525 0.804 2.561 3.197 2.951 2.835 Debre Birhan village dummy
Ethnicity dummies (Tigray excluded)
0.673 0.835 -1.691 -1.778 -1.756 -1.385 Amhara
1.848 2.302 -1.394 -1.334 -0.400 -0.300 Oromo
2.775 4.151 -1.426 -1.745 0.273 0.258 South-Central
1.438 2.017 -1.608 -1.756 -0.704 -0.602 Other/mixed
Religion dummies (Orthodox excluded)
-0.064 -0.050 0.123 0.089 -0.007 -0.004 Muslim
-0.686 -0.384 3.096 1.698 1.748 0.694 Other Christian
-0.505 -0.472 1.526 1.355 0.906 0.591 Other
2.461 2.445 6.966 6.977 6.545 4.490 Intercept
2.814 3.386 3.221 Selection-term
78 153 231 Number of censored observations
427 494 921 Number of uncensored observations
Joint tests:
0.2419 1.37 Ethnicity
0.3341 1.13 ReligionTable 13. Effect of human capital on assets brought to marriage by the gr
(dependent variable is the log of the value of all assets brought to marriage, expressed in current value)
other assets livestock land all assets
1126 1126 1124 1124 Number of observations
0.021 0.078 0.056 0.031 Pseudo R-squared
t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. Wealth of parents
-0.081 -0.010 1.453 0.295 3.733 0.733 2.709 0.253 Land of father (log +1)
0.293 0.115 -0.617 -0.428 -0.213 -0.138 0.051 0.015 Whether father went to school
Competition among siblings
-0.518 -0.097 0.266 0.087 -1.366 -0.414 0.039 0.006 Number of siblings + self (log)
0.877 0.438 1.015 0.890 1.167 0.958 0.529 0.206 Share of sisters among siblings
Personal history
-1.123 -0.013 2.378 0.048 3.265 0.061 2.608 0.024 Age at marriage
2.224 0.208 2.162 0.350 1.908 0.289 0.914 0.067 Number of previous marriages
Human capital
-0.380 -0.020 -0.801 -0.076 1.975 0.170 -0.040 -0.002 Schooling index
0.709 0.008 0.344 0.007 1.639 0.031 1.309 0.012 Years of farming experience
-1.114 -0.045 -0.739 -0.052 -3.313 -0.228 -2.605 -0.081 Years of wage work experience
2.370 0.082 0.316 0.021 -1.377 -0.082 1.207 0.033 Years of self-employment experience
Time and space (Harresaw ommitted)
-0.693 -0.006 0.773 0.013 -5.273 -0.082 0.529 0.004 Number of years since marriage
0.301 0.225 -3.590 -5.717 -0.779 -1.011 -1.702 -0.994 Geblen village dummy
1.177 1.118 2.096 3.863 0.885 1.440 1.505 1.116 DInki village dummy
2.792 2.946 1.016 2.018 1.135 2.031 1.527 1.260 Yetmen village dummy
1.227 1.207 2.366 4.393 -1.976 -3.370 0.261 0.201 Shumshaha village dummy
2.310 2.109 2.453 4.115 2.000 3.050 1.983 1.415 Sirbana Godeti village dummy
0.182 0.168 -1.778 -3.034 1.771 2.742 -0.137 -0.099 Adele Keke village dummy
1.453 1.349 0.292 0.495 1.946 3.023 1.309 0.951 Korodegaga village dummy
1.875 1.541 -0.002 -0.003 0.781 1.090 0.435 0.280 Tirufe Kechema village dummy
-0.504 -0.586 -0.512 -1.102 2.925 5.756 0.506 0.456 Imdibir village dummy
-1.197 -1.355 0.868 1.805 4.168 7.960 0.339 0.298 Aze Deboa village dummy
-1.666 -1.829 -3.240 -6.811 1.940 3.619 -1.757 -1.499 Adado village dummy
-1.268 -1.355 0.361 0.722 3.643 6.609 0.117 0.097 Gara Godo village dummy
-0.202 -0.226 0.228 0.473 1.679 3.178 0.453 0.393 Doma village dummy
2.910 2.794 3.442 6.315 1.120 1.842 1.822 1.367 Debre Birhan village dummy
Ethnicity dummies (Tigray excluded)
-1.705 -1.336 -0.306 -0.472 0.101 0.136 0.193 0.118 Amhara
-0.412 -0.307 0.858 1.198 -0.631 -0.784 0.637 0.371 Oromo
0.232 0.218 0.209 0.371 -1.383 -2.217 0.632 0.460 South-Central
-0.623 -0.529 -1.943 -3.476 -1.590 -2.372 -0.666 -0.442 Other/mixed
Religion dummies (Orthodox excluded)
-0.256 -0.134 1.223 1.179 1.528 1.331 0.036 0.015 Muslim
1.555 0.615 0.305 0.220 0.496 0.317 0.946 0.289 Other Christian
0.862 0.565 1.024 1.367 -0.808 -0.866 -0.413 -0.209 Other
6.554 4.806 -1.289 -1.682 -0.237 -0.289 8.970 5.121 Intercept
3.192 5.165 4.981 2.516 Selection-term
223 516 443 96 Number of censored observations
903 610 681 1028 Number of uncensored observations
Joint tests:
0.0693 2.37 0.8531 0.26 0.0007 5.67 0.0190 3.33 Ethnicity
0.1180 1.84 0.8296 0.37 0.0004 5.22 0.0408 2.50 ReligionTable 14. Effect of human capital on assets brought to marriage by the bride
(dependent variable is the log of the value of all assets brought to marriage, expressed in current value)
other assets livestock all assets
994 994 994 Number of observations
0.128 0.205 0.133 Pseudo R-squared
t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. t- stat. Coef. Wealth of parents
1.659 1.256 0.084 0.037 2.087 0.767 Land of father (log +1)
1.790 3.966 1.105 1.299 0.937 0.985 Whether father went to school
Competition among siblings
-1.203 -1.401 2.852 2.098 0.176 0.103 Number of siblings + self (log)
-0.906 -1.059 0.436 0.280 -0.490 -0.269 Share of sisters among siblings
Personal history
3.508 0.317 0.397 0.020 2.224 0.094 Age at marriage
3.763 2.408 -0.459 -0.166 0.373 0.112 Number of previous marriages
Human capital
-1.447 -0.791 -0.342 -0.082 -1.231 -0.268 Schooling index
-2.226 -0.319 -1.201 -0.078 -0.994 -0.055 Years of farming experience
-0.720 -0.777 0.872 0.370 0.490 0.199 Years of wage work experience
0.325 0.103 0.809 0.175 -0.462 -0.091 Years of self-employment experience
Time and space (Harresaw ommitted)
-0.704 -0.044 -0.979 -0.031 -1.545 -0.043 Number of years since marriage
. -54.458 -1.398 -3.063 -3.710 -7.711 Geblen village dummy
. -70.147 -0.065 -0.230 -3.000 -8.587 DInki village dummy
-1.791 -14.609 -1.424 -5.544 -3.186 -9.729 Yetmen village dummy
-0.910 -5.529 2.066 7.249 -0.106 -0.293 Shumshaha village dummy
-1.799 -10.897 -1.765 -6.150 -3.177 -8.938 Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-2.100 -10.865 -1.954 -6.457 -3.824 -10.563 Adele Keke village dummy
-0.153 -0.681 -1.893 -6.004 -2.386 -6.148 Korodegaga village dummy
-0.716 -3.033 -2.444 -7.440 -3.237 -7.727 Tirufe Kechema village dummy
-0.373 -2.180 0.095 0.464 -1.758 -5.637 Imdibir village dummy
-0.494 -2.921 -0.032 -0.154 -2.186 -7.058 Aze Deboa village dummy
-1.042 -5.965 -1.229 -6.140 -3.642 -12.006 Adado village dummy
-0.423 -2.297 -0.956 -4.411 -2.335 -6.963 Gara Godo village dummy
-0.133 -0.744 . -32.812 -2.158 -6.825 Doma village dummy
-1.307 -7.566 2.121 7.297 0.079 0.210 Debre Birhan village dummy
Ethnicity dummies (Tigray excluded)
-0.344 -1.810 0.114 0.363 1.357 3.304 Amhara
0.685 3.052 0.789 2.329 1.425 3.348 Oromo
0.012 0.055 -1.433 -6.157 -0.065 -0.171 South-Central
0.508 2.909 -1.468 -5.264 -0.344 -0.886 Other/mixed
Religion dummies (Orthodox excluded)
-0.331 -1.080 0.084 0.149 -0.104 -0.154 Muslim
-0.759 -1.589 0.592 1.097 -0.445 -0.558 Other Christian
-0.967 -4.864 . -36.396 -1.093 -3.544 Other
-2.542 -10.811 -2.500 -6.056 0.075 0.151 Intercept
8.804 6.233 6.363 Selection-term
922 793 717 Number of censored observations
72 201 277 Number of uncensored observations
Joint tests:
0.1435 1.81 0.3661 1.06 0.6967 0.48 Ethnicity
0.1363 1.75 0.5155 0.82 0.5792 0.72 Religion
Note: there are not enough uncensored observations to estimate a similar regression for land brought by bridTable 15. Testing Pooling of Parental Resources
(dependent variable is the log of the value of all assets brought to marriage by both spouses)
  subsequent  
marriages first marriage
457 578 Number of observations
0.075 0.048 Pseudo R-squared
t Coef. t Coef. Wealth of parents
0.916 0.083 3.298 0.476 Land of groom's father (log +1)
0.372 0.040 -0.380 -0.073 Land of bride's father (log +1)
0.013 0.004 -0.915 -0.418 Whether groom's father went to school
0.535 0.176 1.433 0.639 Whether bride's father went to school
Competition among siblings
-1.067 -0.174 -0.078 -0.020 Number of groom's siblings + self (log)
-0.143 -0.061 -0.267 -0.189 Share of sisters among groom's siblings
2.303 0.410 0.348 0.105 Number of bride's siblings + self (log)
1.053 0.184 0.133 0.052 Share of sisters among bride's siblings
Personal history
3.804 0.033 1.813 0.040 Groom's age at marriage
-2.264 -0.029 -0.584 -0.017 Bride's age at marriage
Time and space (Harresaw ommitted)
-0.999 -0.008 0.348 0.004 Number of years since marriage
-1.757 -1.270 -1.920 -1.412 Geblen village dummy
-0.263 -0.217 1.808 2.006 DInki village dummy
-0.424 -0.369 0.810 1.123 Yetmen village dummy
-1.090 -0.912 0.642 0.721 Shumshaha village dummy
-1.250 -1.023 2.137 2.100 Sirbana Godeti village dummy
-0.165 -0.135 -1.656 -1.694 Adele Keke village dummy
-0.381 -0.316 0.627 0.649 Korodegaga village dummy
-2.275 -1.737 0.560 0.470 Tirufe Kechema village dummy
-0.444 -0.419 -0.324 -0.392 Imdibir village dummy
-0.066 -0.079 0.044 0.052 Aze Deboa village dummy
-2.158 -2.004 -1.639 -1.905 Adado village dummy
-1.716 -1.546 0.386 0.439 Gara Godo village dummy
-1.038 -0.965 0.101 0.121 Doma village dummy
0.371 0.315 1.739 1.795 Debre Birhan village dummy
Ethnicity dummies (Tigray excluded)
2.599 1.845 -0.996 -0.872 Amhara
3.495 2.475 -0.820 -0.660 Oromo
3.064 2.444 -0.377 -0.382 South-Central
2.318 1.755 -1.926 -1.736 Other/mixed
Religion dummies (Orthodox excluded)
-0.107 -0.045 -0.043 -0.026 Muslim
-1.085 -0.352 1.004 0.449 Other Christian
-1.541 -0.817 -0.281 -0.202 Other
8.930 5.553 6.039 5.750 Intercept
1.567 2.643 Selection-term
11 63 Number of censored observations
446 515 Number of uncensored observations
p-value F-stat p-value F-stat Test that coefficients are equal:
0.616 0.49 0.004 5.48 land of father of bride and of groom
0.860 0.15 0.281 1.27 schooling of father of bride and of groom